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During the past century, Latin America witnessed the expan-
sion of constitutional rights, heralded by the introduction of social
constitutionalism in the Mexican charter of 1917. In conjunction
with this trend, the region also experienced a considerable expan-
sion of the mechanisms of constitutional adjudication. Judicial
review became increasingly institutionalized as innovative mech-
anisms of diffuse as well as concentrated judicial review were
adopted in country after country. Paradoxically, this historical
process was not paralleled by a commitment to constitutionalism,
understood as an agreement among social actors to accept the su-
premacy of the constitution. This gap between formal institutions
and informal political practice remains one of the great puzzles for
students of constitutional law in the region.
How can we explain this gap? This essay makes two claims.
First, Latin America has developed a rich tradition of constitu-
tional litigation over the course of more than a century. This tra-
dition involved the adoption of foreign models that were adapted
to local conditions as well as the development of aboriginal institu-
1. Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh. The information
presented in this paper was collected with support from the National Science Foundation
(SES 0918886). I am indebted to the participants at the International Seminar "Constitu-
tional Litigation: Procedural Protections of Constitutionalism in the Americas and Be-
yond," (Duquesne University, November 5 and 6, 2010) for their valuable insights, and to
Andrea Castagnola and Ignacio Arana for their participation in this project.
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tions that disseminated within (and beyond) the region. Second,
the establishment of legal instruments and specialized courts has
not been sufficient to guarantee the development of constitutional-
ism because governments in most countries repeatedly took over
the judiciary, precluding the consolidation of judicial independ-
ence. One of the most frequent mechanisms employed to reshuffle
the courts was, ironically, the reform of the constitution. The cor-
ollary to the previous two points is that the protection of institu-
tional stability may be the main challenge for Latin America in
the twenty-first century.
I. THE EXPANSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION IN LATIN
AMERICA
Latin America constitutes the richest ecosystem of constitution-
al adjudication in the world. Centralized and decentralized mod-
els of constitutional litigation coexist in the same region--often in
the same country-while foreign legal species intermingle with
native institutions. Structured within the civil law tradition, Lat-
in American legal systems have embraced the principles of Mar-
bury v. Madison,2 the Kelsenian notion of specialized constitution-
al courts, the home-grown amparo procedure, and a pragmatic
concept of centralized judicial review exercised within the Su-
preme Court.
3
During the nineteenth century, Latin American countries im-
ported principles of diffuse judicial review from the legal tradition
of the United States. At present, however, Argentina remains the
only pure example of this model in the area. The Argentine Con-
stitution of 1853 empowered the Supreme Court and the lower
courts to rule in all cases involving constitutional issues. 4 The
first Supreme Court took office in 1863 and asserted its power to
exercise judicial review one year later. 5 However, the Court exer-
cised this power with restraint; it took more than two decades to
declare a federal statute unconstitutional.
6
2. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
3. See Patricio Navia & Julio Rios Figueroa, The Constitutional Adjudication Mosaic
of Latin America, 38 COMP. POL. STUD. 189 (2005).
4. Art. 100, CONSTTUci6N NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.)(1853).
5. Osvaldo Casds, El Control Constitucional de las Leyes Tributarias [The
Constitutional Control of the Tax Laws], L.L.(25-2008) . See Corte Suprema de Justicia
[CSJNI [National Supreme Court of Justice], 'Iinisterio Fiscal v. Calvete," Fallos (1864-1-
340) (Arg.).
6. Alejandro M. Garro, Duquesne University School of Law International Law
Synposium, Access to Argentina's Highest Court: Right or Privilege? (Nov. 5-6 2010). See
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By the early twentieth century, some legal scholars complained
that, compared to their United States counterparts, Argentine jus-
tices behaved too cautiously. Clodomiro Zavalia noted in 1920
that "public law was for [the Argentine Supreme Court] always
secondary; the Court has avoided it as much as the American Su-
preme Court has always pursued it." 7  The author added with
skepticism that "[siome people believe that, had the Court not pro-
ceeded in this way, it would have not preserved its independence.
... Governments, it is said, would have tried to undermine it, in-
tegrating it with people who could be subject to their influence.
8
In spite of Zavalia's disbelief, the Argentine Supreme Court was
eventually dragged into the political debates of the era, and re-
peatedly reshuffled for political reasons after 1946. It is only now,
more than six decades later that the Court seems to be recovering
some of its old prestige.
The institution of amparo, which originated in Mexico in the
mid-nineteenth century, has expanded throughout Latin America
over the course of one hundred and fifty years. At present, all Lat-
in American constitutions, with the sole exception of the Cuban
charter, recognize this concept under different names (amparo,
tutela, protecci6n, or mandado de seguranga). The amparo pro-
ceeding is no doubt the most distinctive contribution of Latin
America to constitutional law. Actions of amparo are usually ex-
traordinary measures intended to protect personal rights other
than the right of locomotion, albeit in the Mexican case the proce-
dure may also perform functions of cassation.9
Although initially conceived as an instrument of decentralized
constitutional litigation, the amparo procedure has been able to
complement, rather than replace, other mechanisms of judicial
review. Thus, the institution has been seamlessly integrated into
the system of diffuse constitutional adjudication in Argentina; into
systems of concentrated judicial review in Bolivia, Chile, Costa
Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, and Uruguay;
Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 'Municipalidad de
la Capital v. Elortondo," Fallos (1888-33- 162) (Arg.).
7. CLODOMIRO ZAVALIA, HISTORIA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA DE LA
REPOBLICA ARGENTINA [History of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Republic of
Argentina] 275 (Jacobo Peuser. 1920). (The translation is that of the author's).
8. Id.
9. Jos6 Gamas Torruco, Professor of Constitutional Law and Economic Law at the
National Autonomous University of Mexico, Constitutional Jurisdiction in Mexico Consti-
tutional Litigation: Procedural Protections of Constitutionalism in the Americans ... and
Beyond: An International Seminar for United States Lawyers (Nov. 5-6, 2010).
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and into mixed systems in Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, and Vene-
zuela.1 0 For example, in Brazil six types of decentralized constitu-
tional actions (the equivalent of amparo, called writ of security,
plus the habeas corpus, the habeas data, the mandate of injunc-
tion, popular actions, and public class actions) coexist with four
centralized procedures under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Fed-
eral Tribunal (the direct action of unconstitutionality, the declara-
tory action of constitutionality, the allegation of disobedience of a
fundamental precept, and the action of unconstitutionality for
omission).'1
This point is worth emphasizing, because over the past five dec-
ades most Latin American countries have embraced some concept
of concentrated review, creating specialized bodies for constitu-
tional adjudication. Perhaps the earliest experiment in this re-
gard was the organic separation between the Federal Court and
the Court of Cassation adopted by the Venezuelan constitution
between 1893 and 1904.12 Later in the twentieth century, Latin
American countries borrowed institutions from the Western Euro-
pean model. In 1945, Ecuador was the first country in the region
to establish a Constitutional Tribunal separated from the Su-
preme Court, although this body was dissolved a year later when
the constitution was abrogated 13. New constitutional courts were
established in Guatemala after 1966, Ecuador in 1967, Chile in
1970 (dissolved by the 1973 military coup and reestablished in
1980), Peru in 1980, Colombia in 1992, and Bolivia in 1998.14
Those courts gained increasing power over time, as they emulated
the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal in the 1990s. In 1988, Brazil
transformed its Supreme Federal Tribunal (STF) into the func-
tional equivalent of a constitutional tribunal and created a sepa-
10. ALLAN R. BREWER-CARfAS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
LATIN AMERICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AMPARO PROCEEDINGS 4,6 (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press. 2009).
11. Keith S. Rosenn, Professor of Law, Procedural Protection of Constitutional Rights
in Brazil, Constitutional Litigation: Procedural Protections of Cornstitutionalism in the
Americans... and Beyond: An International Seminar for United States Lawyers (Nov. 5-6,
2010).
12. VENEZ. CONST. ART. 100, 110, inc. 8 (1893); VENEZ. CONST. ART. 99, 106, inc. 8
(1901).
13. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DEL ECUADOR art. 159, 160 (1945).
14. CONSTITUCION POLfTICA DE GUATEMALA, art 262-65 (1966);, CONSTITUCI6N
POLITICA DE ECUADOR art. 219-22 (1967); CONSTITUCI6N POLiTICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE
CHILE art. 78(a), 78(b), 78(c)(amended by law 17284, January 23, 1970); CONSTITUCI6N
POLITICA DEL PERU art. 296-304 (1974); CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE COLOMBIA art. 239-45
(1991); CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE BOLIVIA art. 119-21(1995).
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rate court, the Superior Tribunal of Justice, to handle questions of
cassation. 15 With the future inauguration of a Constitutional Tri-
bunal in the Dominican Republic, mandated by the 2010 constitu-
tional reform, the region will soon have eight constitutional courts
cast in the Kelsenian tradition.'
6
In the remaining countries, the Supreme Court exercises the
centralized functions of constitutional adjudication. For instance,
the Mexican Supreme Court acquired the authority to address
constitutional controversies and actions of unconstitutionality in a
centralized manner after 1994. Moreover, the most original Latin
American innovation in terms of concentrated judicial review has
been the creation of specialized constitutional chambers within
the Supreme Courts. The text of Latin American constitutions
has mandated the creation of such chambers in Cuba (1940-
1973), 17 and in El Salvador since 1983, in Costa Rica since 1989,
in Paraguay since 1992, in Nicaragua between 1993 and 2005, and
in Venezuela since 1999. The establishment of constitutional
chambers may have enduring consequences for the legal process.18
The most visible example is Costa Rica, where, as Professor Bark-
er has shown, the creation of the Fourth Chamber of the Supreme
Court deeply transformed the process of constitutional adjudica-
tion.19
II. JuDIcIAL TAKEOVERS AND THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM
Unfortunately, the rich ecosystem of Latin American constitu-
tional adjudication has not always guaranteed the governments'
respect for constitutional norms. In spite of notable exceptions,
such as the successful Costa Rican example, constitutionalism has
remained weak throughout the region. The reasons for this phe-
nomenon are historically complex, but one pattern remains dis-
15. Constituigo Federal art. 102, 105 (1988).
16. OSWALD LARA BORGES, ET AL., DISEI&O CONSTITUCIONAL Y ESTABILIDAD JUDICIAL EN
AMPRICA LATINA [Constitutional Design and Judicial Stability in Latin America], 1900-
2009, pp. 9-10 (2010).
17. The Cuban Constitutional Chamber (Tribunal de Garantias Constitucionales y
Sociales) was created in 1940 and dissolved in 1973, but it lost all power after 1952. See
DOMINGO GARCIA BELAfPNDE, El Tribunal de Garantias Constitucionales y Sociales de Cuba
(1940-1952) [The Cuban Tribunal of Constitutional and Social Guarantees (1940-1952)], 37
Boletin Mexicano de Derecho Comparado 109, 283-312 (2004).
18. OSWALD LARA BORGES, ET AL., DISEIRO CONSTITUCIONAL Y ESTABILIDAD JUDICIAL EN
AMtRICA LATINA [Constitutional Design and Judicial Stability in Latin America], 1900-
2009, p. 9 (2010).
19. ROBERT S. BARKER, CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION: THE COSTA RICAN
EXPERIENCE 95-175 (Vandeplas Publishing. 2008).
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tinctive. In many Latin American countries, political leaders have
promoted the establishment of formal constitutional protections
while making sure that the judges in charge of interpreting them
remain loyal to the ruling party.
20
In an article published in 1987, Professor Rosenn identified sev-
en ways in which judicial independence has been undermined
throughout the region: the formal abrogation of judicial autono-
my, the creation of special jurisdictions, the transfer of judges, the
erosion of judges' salaries, failure to comply with the judges' deci-
sions, pressures exercised by the dominant executive branch, and
the wholesale dismissal of judges. 21 "Perhaps the most devastat-
ing attack on judicial independence has been the wholesale purg-
ing of courts.. . "he noted in the paper. 22 Indeed, the most devas-
tating of such purges have taken place at the highest levels of the
judicial hierarchy, undermining the Supreme Courts as well as
the Constitutional Tribunals.
23
In order to address this issue, let me introduce the concept of a
judicial takeover. Judicial takeover refers to a situation in which
a new majority of justices in the Supreme Court or the Constitu-
tional Tribunal is appointed in any single year. This means that
whoever controls the appointment of new justices at the time-the
executive, the legislature, a dictator-has a unique opportunity to
seize control of the judiciary and manipulate the long-term out-
comes of constitutional litigation. Defined in this way, judicial
takeovers appear to be an extraordinary event, the equivalent of a
legal tsunami in the seas of constitutional adjudication. But in
Latin America, the extraordinary has been quite frequent.
The information presented in this section is the product on an
ongoing historical study of seventeen countries between 1900 and
2010.24 Our investigation documented that judicial takeovers took
20. Keith S. Rosenn, The Success of Constitutionalism in the United States and its
Failure in Latin America An Explanation, 22 U. MIAMI INTER-AM L. REV. 1, 20-29 (1990).
21. Keith S. Rosenn, The Protection of Judicial Independence in Latin America, 19 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM L. REV. 1, 23-31 (1987).
22. Id. at 27.
23. See GRETCHEN HELMKE, COURTS UNDER CONSTRAINTS: JUDGES, GENERALS, AND
PRESIDENTS IN ARGENTINA (Cambridge University Press. 2005); see also AGUSTIN
GRIJALVA, COURTS AND POLITICAL PARTIES: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN
ECUADOR (VDM Verlag Dr. Miller. 2010).
24. This study has been funded by the National Science Foundation (SES 0918886).
The countries covered by our historical investigation are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hondu-
ras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.
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place at least 250 times over the past 110 years. 25 That is, on av-
erage a court has been reshuffled in the region every six months.
About ninety percent of those episodes affected the composition of
the Supreme Courts, simply because Constitutional Tribunals
have only been in place for few decades.
The previous figures suggest that the typical Latin American
Supreme Court has confronted a risk of political takeover of above
twelve percent per year; this yields a cumulative risk of takeover
of roughly seventy-three percent over the course of a decade.
However, as any actuary knows, the average risk may hide con-
siderable variation across cases. The countries with the greatest
frequency of judicial takeovers have been Guatemala, El Salvador,
Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, Paraguay, and the Dominican Repub-
lic, where an episode of this nature took place, on average, every
four years over the past century. At the other extreme, although
not completely free from judicial takeovers, Chile, Uruguay, Costa
Rica, and Brazil have presented the most stable courts in the re-
gion. Chile and Uruguay suffered takeovers once approximately
every two decades, while the frequency has been much lower in
Costa Rica and Brazil. Not surprisingly, these have been tradi-
tionally considered among the countries with the most independ-
ent judiciaries in the region.26 The appendix to this article lists
the dates of such episodes by country and supports the above in-
formation with respect to frequency of judicial takeovers.
Different circumstances may explain why political leaders are
conveniently able to appoint a majority of justices in any single
year, and four explanations easily come to mind. First, some con-
stitutions establish fixed terms in office for the Supreme Court or
the Constitutional Tribunal. If all terms expire at the same
time-and particularly if reelection is not allowed-this arrange-
ment may allow political leaders to take over the courts from time
to time. This power, however, is constrained by the constitutional
duration of the terms; politicians cannot freely choose the timing
of the judicial takeover. Second, the leaders of military coups may
have forced the exit of justices or simply dismissed them illegally.
Third, political leaders may "pack" the courts, expanding the
number of seats and nominating a new majority to fill the vacan-
25. Historical sources for Cuba, Venezuela, and for Nicaragua before 1913 have not
been identified yet. This study is supported by the National Science Foundation (SES
0918886).
26. See generally Joel G. Verner, The Independence of Supreme Courts in Latin Ameri-
ca: A Review of the Literature, 16 J. of Latin Am. Stud. 463 (1984).
Spring 2011 139
Duquesne Law Review
cies that they have created. Fourth, a constitutional reform may
reshape the legal system, providing an opportunity for politicians
to restructure the composition of high courts in accordance to the
new constitution. Some of the above-mentioned mechanisms are
not mutually exclusive-for instance, a constitutional reform may
expand the size of the Court, allowing for its packing-but for ana-
lytical convenience they may be addressed separately.
In the remaining pages it is not possible to attempt a complete
explanation of judicial takeovers during the Twentieth Century,
but we can provide a broad characterization of those episodes in
order to assess the context in which they took place. About one-
quarter of the cases can be explained by the length of constitu-
tional terms: when justices ended their terms concurrently, a new
court was nominated. At the same time, over three-quarters of all
judicial takeovers did not result from legal rules about tenure;
they were instead the product of extraordinary circumstances.
A history of unstable political regimes may be part of the expla-
nation for this phenomenon: about three-fifths of all political
takeovers took place under authoritarian rule.27 The impact of
political instability, however, was not merely related to military
coups. Only about ten percent of all takeovers took place as a re-
sult of military uprisings, and a similar proportion took place on
the opposite end when authoritarian regimes transited into demo-
cratic politics. Moreover, some well-established dictators reshuf-
fled their courts recurrently. The Supreme Court was recast five
times during the dictatorship of Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican
Republic (1930-1961), and the same number of episodes took place
during the rule of Alfredo Stroessner in Paraguay (1954-1989).28
Even though the packing of the Argentine Supreme Court in
1990 has received much attention, only about twelve percent of
the judicial takeovers resulted from packing schemes that ex-
panded the size of the courts. However, as the aforementioned
National Science Foundation study indicates, almost forty percent
of all cases took place as a consequence of constitutional reforms-
the adoption of new constitutions or constitutional amendments.
The countries that more insistently restructured their high courts
in the context of constitutional reforms were Ecuador (which did
so eleven times during the period under study), Honduras (nine
27. Scott Mainwaring, et al., Classifying Political Regimes in Latin America, 1945-
2004, in REGIMES AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA. THEORIES AND METHODS 123-60
(Gerardo Munck ed., 2007).
28. See Appendix.
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times), Colombia, Guatemala, and El Salvador (six times each),
Mexico (five times), and Bolivia (four times).
III. THE QUEST FOR NECESSARY CONDITIONS
The obvious lesson of this historical overview is that it is very
difficult to protect judicial stability in a broader context of political
turmoil. 29 Perhaps more puzzling is the fact that constitutional
changes have been one of the most common mechanisms underly-
ing judicial takeovers. The same constitutional reforms that cre-
ated new instruments for constitutional litigation often served as
a pretext to undermine the autonomy of the judiciary, and the
same reforms that presumably bolstered citizen rights were also
used to weaken the judges in charge of protecting them.
This is perhaps the most important lesson to be drawn from the
Latin American experience. The protection of constitutionalism
demands at least two necessary conditions: legal instruments and
independent judges willing to apply them properly. These two
conditions may not be sufficient to secure constitutional rights.
Other factors-such as the presence of a qualified and an inde-
pendent bar, a responsible political elite, and relatively equal ac-
cess to justice for the most disadvantaged sectors of society-may
also be critical. In the absence of any of the two conditions just
mentioned, constitutional principles will be hardly enforced.
In Latin America, constitutional change has usually been in-
voked in order to create new legal instruments, but quite often has
served as a justification to undermine the courts in charge of ap-
plying them. Given the rich environment for constitutional adju-
dication already established, it follows that the main challenge for
Latin America in the twenty-first century may not be fostering
legal innovation, but achieving legal integrity.
29. E.g., The Success of Constitutionalism in the United States and its Failure in Latin




NEW MAJORITIES APPOINTED TO LATIN AMERICAN HIGH COURTS
(1900-2010)
1. Supreme Courts
Argentina (1947, 1955, 1958, 1966, 1973, 1976, 1983, 1990)
Bolivia (1900, 1909, 1919, 1932, 1936, 1940, 1941, 1944, 1946,
1948, 1952, 1956, 1957, 1961, 1965, 1967, 1970, 1972, 1974,
1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1999)
Brazil (1989)
Chile (1903, 1927)
Colombia (1905, 1910, 1924, 1935, 1940, 1954, 1957, 1958,
1986)
Costa Rica (1920, 1922, 1948)
Dominican Republic (1903, 1904, 1908, 1912, 1924, 1934,
1938, 1942, 1945, 1948, 1962, 1963, 1966, 1982, 1986, 1997)
Ecuador (1906, 1907, 1913, 1918, 1929, 1938, 1945, 1968,
1970, 1972, 1973, 1978, 1979, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2004,
2005, 2009)
El Salvador (1903, 1905, 1907, 1913, 1915, 1919, 1921, 1923,
1925, 1927, 1931, 1944, 1945, 1946, 1948, 1950, 1956, 1960,
1962, 1965, 1968, 1971, 1979, 1982, 1984, 1989, 1994)
Guatemala (1912, 1920, 1931, 1936, 1940, 1945, 1949, 1953,
1956, 1960, 1963, 1966, 1970, 1974, 1978, 1982, 1984, 1986,
1992, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009)
Honduras (1903, 1907, 1911, 1913, 1920, 1924, 1925, 1929,
1933, 1949, 1954, 1957, 1958, 1963, 1965, 1971, 1972, 1975,
1980, 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2009)
Mexico (1917, 1919, 1923, 1929, 1935, 1941, 1995)
Nicaragua (1913, 1925, 1931, 1937, 1945, 1950, 1963, 1979,
1988)
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Panama (1903, 1908, 1912, 1914, 1916, 1928, 1941, 1946,
1968, 1983, 1990)
Peru (1930, 1952, 1969, 1973, 1976, 1981, 1986, 1992, 2007)
Paraguay (1902, 1905, 1906, 1910, 1911, 1913, 1916, 1920,
1927, 1930, 1931, 1934, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1940, 1947, 1949,
1954, 1964, 1968, 1979, 1988, 1989, 1995, 2004)
Uruguay (1907, 1962, 1972, 1978, 1985)
2. Constitutional Tribunals
Bolivia (1998, 2010)
Chile (1971, 1981, 1985, 2006)
Colombia (1992, 1993, 2001, 2009)
Ecuador (1997, 1999, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007)
Guatemala (1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006)
Peru (1996, 2002, 2007)
Note: Information is not available for Venezuela, and it is
available for Nicaragua after 1912, for Ecuador's Constitu-
tional Tribunal since 1997 and for Peru's Constitutional Tri-
bunal since 1996. Episodes were counted only if a new major-
ity of justices entered the court within the same year (this
rule applied also when a court was convened for the first
time).30
30. [Editor's Note: The information contained in the Appendix is based upon research
and data compiled by the author for study NSF-SES 0918886].
Spring 2011

